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NOTE
SUPPORTIVE YET SKEPTIC: KISOR V. WILKIE CASTS
FURTHER DOUBT ON DEFERENCE DOCTRINE’S LONGEVITY
MICHAEL SAMMARTINO*

“The power of judicial review . . . lies with the courts because of
a deep belief that the heritage they hold makes them experts in
the synthesis of design. Such difficulties as have arisen have
come because courts cast aside that role to assume to themselves
expertness in matters of industrial health, utility engineering,
railroad management, even bread baking. The rise of the
administrative process represented the hope that policies to
shape such fields could most adequately be developed by men
bred to the facts.”1
“We managed to live with the administrative state before
Chevron. We could do it again. Put simply, it seems to me that
in a world without Chevron very little would change—except
perhaps the most important things.”2
In Kisor v. Wilkie,3 the United States Supreme Court considered whether
to retain its practice of deferring to an administrative agency’s interpretations
of its own regulations. Despite decades-long conservative criticism of Auer
v. Robbins4 deference’s5 constitutionality and appropriateness, the Kisor
Court voted to retain Auer’s deference doctrine. While the Court’s decision
reads as a fervent defense of administrative expertise, Kisor stops short of
© 2020 Michael Sammartino.
*J.D. Candidate, 2021, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law. The
author would like to thank his editors at the Maryland Law Review, especially Andrew White,
Taylor Hallowell, Bianca Spinosa, and Lauren Fash, for their thoughtful feedback, suggestions, and
patience. The author would also like to thank Professor Rena Steinzor, for her invaluable guidance
and for introducing him to the field of Administrative Law. The author also wishes to thank his
family and friends for their encouragement and support throughout the writing process.
1. JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 154–55 (1938).
2. Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d. 1142, 1158 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring).
3. 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019).
4. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997).
5. Auer deference is a doctrine under which courts may grant deference to an executive
agency’s interpretation of an ambiguity in its own regulations. Id.; see infra Section II.D.2.
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settling the question of whether the deference doctrine as a whole will
ultimately survive the Roberts Court in a workable form. Kisor’s framework
indicates an underlying distrust of the administrative state and suggests a
further retreat from the Court’s more deferential administrative
jurisprudence.6
Despite upholding Auer deference, Kisor’s implications suggest further
erosion of the Court’s deference doctrine. Part I will discuss Kisor’s
procedural history. Part II will trace the history of the Court’s deference
doctrine and the diverging historic precedents of Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council7 and Auer, with particular attention
placed on the recent efforts to call deference doctrine into question. Part III
will review Justice Kagan’s majority opinion, which upholds Auer deference,
and Justice Gorsuch’s concurrence, which argues for Auer’s complete
abandonment. Lastly, Part IV will argue that the Court’s decision realigns
Auer deference with its historic precedent and redresses the constitutional
issues on which Auer’s criticisms are based.8 Kisor’s framework, however,
suggests how the Court may further narrow its deference doctrine, and, given
the current ideological makeup of the Court, Kisor casts further doubt on
deference doctrine’s longevity.9
I. THE CASE
In 1982, petitioner Kisor applied for disability benefits from the
Department of Veterans Affairs (“VA”).10 He claimed that he had developed
post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) due to his participation in combat
operations during the Vietnam War.11 However, the VA Regional Office’s
(“RO”) evaluating psychiatrist determined Kisor had a personality disorder,
not PTSD, and denied Kisor his benefits.12
On June 5, 2006, Kisor reopened his claim, requesting benefits
extending back to the date of his 1982 application.13 While his request was
pending, Kisor provided additional service records to the VA, including a
recent diagnosis of PTSD and other records documenting his participation in
combat.14 In response to the reopened claim, the RO agreed that Kisor
suffered from PTSD, and granted him benefits in September 2007.15 The

6. See infra Section IV.C.
7. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
8. See infra Section IV.A–B.
9. See infra Section IV.D.
10. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2409 (2019).
11. Id.
12. Kisor v. Shulkin, 869 F.3d 1360, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting J.A. 21), aff’g Kisor v.
McDonald, No. 14-2811, 2016 WL 337517 (Vet. App. Jan. 27, 2016).
13. Id. at 1362.
14. Id.
15. Id.
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benefits, however, only extended from the date of his 2006 request to reopen,
rather than from the date of his 1982 application.16
Kisor subsequently filed a Notice of Disagreement17 in November 2007,
arguing that the effective date of his benefits should have been earlier than
June 5, 2006.18 The Board of Veterans’ Appeals affirmed the RO’s
decision.19 First, the Board ruled that the decision was final and unreviewable
since Kisor failed to appeal the 1982 decision.20 Second, the Board explained
that under VA regulations,21 retroactive benefits could only be awarded if it
found “relevant official service department records that . . . had not been
associated with the claims file when VA first decided the claim.”22 The
Board then determined Kisor’s additional “records were not ‘relevant’”
because they related only to a current disability rather than a prior diagnosis.23
Kisor sought review in the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, which
affirmed the Board’s decision for generally the same reasons.24
Kisor then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit.25 The court rejected Kisor’s argument that a “relevant”
record could concern other criteria for receiving disability benefits instead of
having to relate to the basis of a prior denial.26 Finding the VA regulation
“ambiguous as to the meaning of the term ‘relevant,’” the Federal Circuit
explained that it “defer[s] to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulation
‘as long as the regulation is ambiguous and the agency’s interpretation is
neither plainly erroneous nor inconsistent.’”27 In the court’s view, the
Board’s ruling was based on the premise that “‘relevant’ mean[t]
noncumulative and pertinent to the matter at issue in the case.”28 Finding the

16. Id. at 1363.
17. A Notice of Disagreement is an appeal of an agency’s decision in the form of “a written
communication from the claimant or the claimant’s representative expressing dissatisfaction or
disagreement with an adjudicative determination of an agency of original jurisdiction.” 33 Fed.
Proc., L. Ed. § 79:210 (2020); 38 C.F.R. § 20.201 (2019).
18. Kisor, 869 F.3d at 1362.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(c) (2019) (permitting the VA to reconsider a claim “if [the] VA
receives or associates with the claims file relevant official service department records that existed
and had not been associated with the claims file when VA first decided the claim”).
22. Kisor, 869 F.3d at 1363.
23. Id. at 1364.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 1365.
26. Id. at 1366.
27. Id. at 1367; see Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (explaining the agency’s
interpretation of its own regulations is “controlling unless ‘plainly erroneous or inconsistent with
the regulation’” (quoting Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 359
(1989))).
28. Kisor, 869 F.3d at 1368.
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Board’s interpretation not “plainly erroneous or inconsistent” with the VA
regulation, the court accordingly affirmed the Board’s decision.29
Kisor petitioned to the Supreme Court, which subsequently granted
certiorari solely “to decide whether to overrule Auer and . . . Seminole
Rock.”30
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
While there is disagreement and uncertainty as to the legal foundations
of deference doctrine, courts have historically given executive agencies a
degree of leeway in interpreting their governing statutes and regulations.31
The Court’s modern deference doctrine emerged out of the administrative
state’s expansion in size and scope during the New Deal and World War II.32
It would take, however, an additional fifty years for the doctrine to ripen into
the highly deferential, and contentious standard at issue in Kisor.33 After
decades of deference doctrine’s expansion, the Court’s conservative justices
endeavored to chip away at the doctrine, gradually calling into question the
appropriateness, basis, and justification of deference.34 These critiques frame
the competing views of deference presented by Justices Kagan and Gorsuch
in Kisor.
Section A discusses the historical origins of deference. Section B
discusses the emergence of the Court’s modern deference doctrine in the
1940s. Section C traces Seminole Rock’s expansion into Auer’s highly
deferential standard. Lastly, Section D describes the conservative pushback
against deference and the calls to abrogate Auer and Seminole Rock.
A. Deference’s Historic Roots Emerged During the Nineteenth
Century and Through the New Deal.
Courts have long granted varying degrees of deference to the other
branches’ statutory and regulatory interpretations. Early courts recognized
that the views of those who drafted, enacted, and implemented the law were
of value when tasked with interpreting a textual ambiguity.35 Though courts
29. Id. at 1368–69.
30. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2409 (2019).
31. See infra Section II.A.
32. See infra Section II.B.
33. See infra Section II.C.
34. See infra Section II.D.
35. See, e.g., Edwards’ Lessee v. Darby, 25 U.S. 206, 209–10 (1827) (explaining that “the
contemporaneous construction of those who were called upon to act under the law, and were
appointed to carry its provisions into effect, is entitled to very great respect”); see also McCulloch
v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 401 (1819) (explaining that longstanding “exposition[s] of the
constitution, deliberately established by legislative acts . . . ought not to be lightly disregarded”);
Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. 299, 306, 309 (1803) (holding that the “practice” of judges riding circuit
without “distinct commissions” constituted a strong “contemporary interpretation” of the
Constitution).
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began affording greater controlling weight to executive interpretations
around the turn of the twentieth century,36 there was still no general doctrine
of deference. Though willing to grant great weight to an agency’s
conclusions of fact and law, courts still enjoyed wide discretion over how
much weight to give to an agency’s determinations.37 During the New Deal,
deference doctrine was somewhat unpredictable and multifarious: Courts
were more inclined to defer on questions of fact, but courts were still unsure
as to the appropriate weight that should be afforded to questions of law.38
A series of decisions from 1936 to 1944 affirmed the Court’s reluctance
to disturb agency interpretations provided in specific, adjudicatory
applications. This reluctance stemmed both from acknowledgement of an
agency’s technical expertise and from Congress’s delegation of authority to
the agency. The Court recognized that an agency’s administrative experience
necessarily implied subject matter expertise which warranted limited judicial
interference in an agency’s decision.39 Further, the Court recognized
deference as a means to respect Congress’s legislative choices to delegate
administrative power and decision-making discretion.40

36. See, e.g., Bates & Guild Co. v. Payne, 194 U.S. 106, 108–110 (1904) (deferring to the
Postmaster General’s interpretation of new postal regulations because the interpretation “carr[ied]
with it a strong presumption of its correctness” and was a reasonable exercise of discretion); United
States v. Eaton, 169 U.S. 331, 343 (1898) (“The interpretation given to the regulations by the
department charged with their execution, and by the official who has the power . . . to amend them,
is entitled to the greatest weight, and we see no reason in this case to doubt its correctness.”).
37. See, e.g., McLaren v. Fleischer, 256 U.S. 477, 481 (1921) (holding that an agency’s
interpretation of an ambiguous statute “is entitled to great respect and, if acted upon for a number
of years, will not be disturbed except for cogent reasons”).
38. Compare Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 64–65 (1932) (upholding the judiciary’s ability
to review agency findings of fact de novo), with St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298
U.S. 38, 54 (1936) (holding that agency findings of fact should be undisturbed), and Norwegian
Nitrogen Prods. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 315–316, 321 (1933) (holding that past
“administrative practice, consistent and generally unchallenged, will not be overturned” unless
“shown to be arbitrary”).
39. See Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. United States, 299 U.S. 232, 236 (1936) ( “[The] [C]ourt is not
at liberty to substitute its own discretion for that of administrative officers who have kept within the
bounds of their administrative powers.”); see also Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Hearst Publ’ns, Inc.,
322 U.S. 111, 130–31 (1944) (explaining that “[e]veryday experience in the administration of the
statute” justifies granting deference, so long as an agency’s determination is supported by the record
and has “a reasonable basis in law”).
40. See Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402, 403, 412–14 (1941) (deferring to the Bituminous Coal
Commission’s finding that a railroad which contracted out the mining of coal exclusively to provide
fuel for its own use was subject to a tax based on the Commission’s interpretation of the term
“producer-consumer” on grounds that deference was necessary to respect Congress’s express
delegation of interpretive authority to the Commission); see also Fed. Commc’n Comm’n v.
Pottsville Broad. Co., 309 U.S. 134, 146 (1940) (holding that reviewing courts could not overrule
an agency’s procedural rules since “[i]nterference by the courts is not conducive to the development
of habits of responsibility in administrative agencies”).
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B. The Development of Deference Doctrine’s Modern Framework
Although the Court entrenched and expanded deference doctrine during
the late 1930s and early 1940s, courts generally lacked a framework to guide
the doctrine’s application. In Skidmore v. Swift41 and Bowles v. Seminole
Rock & Sand Co.,42 the Court’s efforts to establish such a framework laid the
foundation of modern deference doctrine.
1. Modern Deference Doctrine Emerges from the Court’s Decisions
in Skidmore v. Swift and Seminole Rock v. Bowles
In Skidmore, the Court endeavored to address the lack of statutory
guidance as to whether and to what degree deference was warranted.43
Although the agency’s conclusions stemmed from its accumulated
experience, knowledge, and expertise, Justice Jackson explained that the
agency’s conclusions “do not constitute an interpretation of the Act or a
[judicial] standard,” that would be binding on the lower courts.44 The Court
also noted that interpretative documents and prior enforcement actions serve
as a practical guide and provide notice as to how a statute will be applied.45
In light of this paradox, Justice Jackson established a test to guide courts in
determining how much weight courts should afford to an agency’s legal
conclusions.46 Whether deference is warranted “depend[s] [on] the
thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its
consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors
which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.”47
Following Skidmore, inconsistencies plagued the lower courts as to the
circumstances and degree of deference given to agency interpretations of

41. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
42. 325 U.S. 410 (1945).
43. 323 U.S. at 139 (“[T]here is no statutory provision as to what, if any, deference courts
should pay to the Administrator’s conclusions.”). In Skidmore, despite a Wage and Hour Division
Bulletin interpreting “[h]ours worked” to include any “time given by the employee to the employer,”
the district court concluded that time spent waiting on-call “does not constitute hours worked, for
which overtime compensation [was] due.” Id. at 136–38. The United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court, but the Supreme Court reversed, relying on the Wage
and Hour Division’s interpretation of the text provided in the Bulletin. Id. at 140.
44. Id. at 139.
45. Id. at 137–138.
46. Id. at 140.
47. Id.
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statutes and regulations.48 The following year, the court sought to resolve the
lower court confusion in Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co.49
Seminole Rock concerned the meaning of “highest price” within the
context of Maximum Price Regulation No. 188.50 The Office of Price
Administration (“OPA”) sought to enjoin Seminole Rock from selling
crushed stone at a rate above the regulation’s established maximum rate.51
Writing for the Court, Justice Murphy explained that, for issues of statutory
interpretation of administrative regulations, “a court must necessarily look to
the administrative construction of the regulation if the meaning of the words
used is in doubt.”52 Though he noted that congressional intent and
constitutional issues may be relevant for resolving an ambiguity, “the
ultimate criterion is the administrative interpretation, which becomes of
controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the
regulation.”53 According to Justice Murphy, the “only tools” available to the
Court were the regulation’s text and the “relevant interpretations of the
Administrator.”54
Engaging with the text of the regulation, Justice Murphy found the term
“highest price” susceptible to three potential meanings, but found the only
appropriate meaning to be the price charged for actual delivery of an article.55
Justice Murphy then concluded that since OPA had uniformly taken the same
position in defining “highest price,” OPA’s interpretation controlled.56 Thus,
in Seminole Rock, the Court’s attempt to resolve inconsistencies in the lower
courts resulted in a new standard of deference that provided controlling
weight to agency actions with a more limited scope of judicial review than of
Skidmore.

48. Compare Bowles v. Nu Way Laundry Co., 144 F.2d 741, 746 (10th Cir. 1944) (finding
that the OPA Administrator’s interpretations of regulations, “if not controlling, [were] entitled to
great weight so long as they d[id] not distort or pervert the plain intendment of the Act”), with
Bowles v. Simon, 145 F.2d 334, 337 (7th Cir. 1944) (concluding that courts may follow the
Administrator’s interpretations, but rejecting the argument that such interpretations are controlling),
and Lubin v. Streg, 56 F. Supp. 146, 147 (E.D.N.Y. 1944) (stating that while OPA interpretations
are entitled to respect, “they are not binding authority”).
49. 325 U.S. 410 (1945).
50. Id. at 412. The OPA promulgated Maximum Price Regulation No. 188 under the Price
Adjustment Act. Id. at 413. This regulation established a nationwide price freeze and prohibited a
seller of specified building materials and consumer goods (including crushed stone) from charging
more than the price charged during the specified base period of March 1–31, 1942. Id. at 411–13.
51. Id. at 412.
52. Id. at 414.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. 414–15 (quoting Maximum Price Reduction No. 188 § 1499.153(a)(2)(i)).
56. Id. at 417–18 ( “Any doubts concerning this interpretation . . . are removed by reference to
the administrative construction of this method of computing the ceiling price [provided in an OPA
issued bulletin].”).
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2. The Administrative Procedure Act Restates the Law of Judicial
Review
Three years after Seminole Rock, Congress enacted the Administrative
Procedure Act (“APA”).57 Section 702 of the APA confers the right to
judicial review to any person harmed, “adversely affected or aggrieved by
agency action.”58 Section 706 codifies the scope of judicial review.59 Under
section 706, a “reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law,
interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning
or applicability of the terms of an agency action.”60 The Attorney General’s
Manual, issued immediately after the APA’s passage, described section 706
as a restatement of the law of judicial review with respect to agency actions.61
Though there is little evidence in the legislative history as to whether
Congress intended section 706 to speak to the issue of judicial deference to
agency decisions, the Court has generally interpreted section 706 to permit
agency deference. 62 More recently, however, the Court’s conservatives have
called into question whether deference is permissible under section 706 and
whether section 706 only permits de novo review.63

57. Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (codified as amended 5 U.S.C. §§ 500–596) (1966)).
58. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2018).
59. Id. § 706(2)(A)–(F) (“[Courts may] hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings,
and conclusions found to be: (A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law; (B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity ; (C) in
excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right; (D) without
observance of procedure required by law; (E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject
to sections 556 and 557 of this title [5 U.S.C. §§ 556–57] or otherwise reviewed on the record of an
agency hearing provided by statute; or (F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are
subject to trial de novo by the reviewing court.”).
60. Id.
61. TOM C. CLARK, ATTORNEY GENERAL, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 94 (1947) (“The intended result of the introductory clause of
[section 706] is to restate the existing law as to the area of reviewable agency action.”).
62. See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227 (2001) (citing section 706 in
holding that deference is appropriate given an explicit or implicit delegation of interpretive authority
from Congress); Fed. Commc’n Comm’n v. Fox Television Studios, 556 U.S. 502, 513–14 (2009)
(explaining that, under the narrow standard of review established in section 706(2)(A), “‘a court is
not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency,’ and should ‘uphold a decision of less than ideal
clarity if the agency’s path may reasonably be discerned’” (internal citation omitted) (quoting
Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas–Best Freight System, Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 286 (1974))).
63. See, e.g., Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1151–58 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch,
J., concurring) (arguing that the APA requires de novo review, rather than permits Chevron
deference).
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C. Deference Doctrine Gradually Expanded over the Last Half of the
Twentieth Century
Though Seminole Rock introduced a new standard of deference, the case
saw little application during the 1940s and 1950s.64 Beginning with Udall v.
Tallman,65 however, the Court “rediscovered” Seminole Rock and ushered in
the era of deference doctrine’s expansion, which ultimately culminated in the
Auer v. Robbins decision.66 The Court, nonetheless, refined the deference
doctrine by distinguishing the agency’s interpretation of a statute from the
agency’s interpretation of its regulations.67
1. Rediscovering Seminole Rock’s “Controlling Weight” Language
The Court’s decision in Tallman began the era of deference doctrine’s
expansion.68 In Tallman, the Court deferred to the Secretary of the Interior’s
interpretation of a Bureau of Land Management order regulating oil and gas
leasing.69
First, the Court noted that Tallman had notice of the Secretary’s
interpretation prior to submitting his application.70 The Court then
emphasized the principle that long-standing interpretations of textual
ambiguities made by those delegated administrative authority are “entitled to
great respect” and should “not be disturbed except for cogent reasons.”71 In
the context of ambiguous regulations, the Court determined deference to be
“even more clearly in order.”72 Relying on Seminole Rock, the Court
determined that so long as the agency’s “interpretation is not unreasonable,”
then the agency’s interpretation of the regulation warranted controlling
weight.73 After Tallman, the Court began employing Seminole Rock’s
“controlling weight” language with greater frequency, further solidifying the
64. Between 1945 and 1965, the Court cited Seminole Rock only twice. See M. Kraus & Bros.
Inc. v. United States, 327 U.S. 614, 622 (1946) (citing Seminole Rock in relation to a timing issue
concerning a conviction under Maximum Price Regulation No. 269); Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S.
331, 355 (1955) (Reed, J., dissenting) (“Such reasonable interpretation promptly adopted and longcontinued by the President and the Board should be respected by the courts. That has been judicial
practice heretofore.”).
65. 380 U.S. 1 (1965).
66. 519 U.S. 452 (1997); see infra Section II.C.1, C.3.
67. See infra Section II.C.2.
68. Tallman, 380 U.S. at 22–23.
69. Id. at 16–18. After initially suspending oil and gas leases in a part of Alaska, the Bureau
of Land Management issued an order reopening the lands to leasing. Id. at 7. Tallman applied, but
Interior rejected his application. Id. at 2–3. The Secretary interpreted the suspension order as to
have not expressly barred future oil and gas leasing, thereby permitting consideration of any pending
applications filed during the suspension period. Id. at 6.
70. Id. at 17 (explaining that “[t]he Secretary’s interpretation had . . . been a matter of public
record”).
71. Id. at 18 (citing McLaren v. Fleischer, 256 U.S. 477, 480–81 (1921)).
72. Id. at 16.
73. Id. at 18.
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doctrine and applying it to agency interpretations of statutes in addition to
interpretations of regulations.74
2. Chevron Leads to a Distinction Between Deference to Statutory
Interpretations and Deference to Interpretions of Regulations
By the early 1980s, though the core tenants of deference doctrine were
entrenched, the Court still lacked a general guiding framework as to when
deference applied.75 In 1984, the Court provided such a framework in
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council.76 In Chevron,
the Court held that the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia erred by ignoring the EPA’s definition of the term “source” to
strike down an EPA regulation.77 Noting a “long recognized” tradition of
deference to agency statutory interpretations,78 the Court established a twostep test to guide judicial review of an agency’s interpretation of a statute.79
First, courts must evaluate “whether Congress has directly spoken to the
precise question at issue.”80 If so, then the court “must give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”81 Second, “if the statute is
silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue,” the Court must
consider whether the agency’s interpretation is a “permissible construction

74. See, e.g., Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 566 (1980) (deferring to the
Federal Reserve Board’s interpretation of the Truth in Lending Act because “[t]he Act is best
construed by those who gave it substance in promulgating regulations thereunder”); United States
v. Larionoff, 431 U.S. 864, 872–73 (1977) (accepting the government’s interpretation as correct
since it “[was] not plainly inconsistent with the wording of the regulations”); Ehlert v. United States,
402 U.S. 99, 105 (1971) (explaining that, in light of an ambiguity, the Court was “obligated to regard
as controlling a reasonable, consistently applied administrative interpretation”); United States v.
Chicago, 400 U.S. 8, 10 (1970) (deferring to the Interstate Commerce Commission’s interpretation
of the word “train” in the Interstate Commerce Act); Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Stanisic,
395 U.S. 62, 72 (1969) (“[W]e find it dispositive that the agency responsible for promulgating and
administering the regulation has interpreted it to apply even when the vessel has departed.”); Thorpe
v. Hous. Auth. of Durham, 393 U.S. 268, 276 (1969) (deferring to a Housing and Urban
Development circular issued while the related case was pending before the Court).
75. Compare Fed. Election Comm’n v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S 27,
31–32 (1981) (explaining that while courts are obligated to “reject administrative
constructions . . . inconsistent with the statutory mandate” or legislative purpose, deference is
warranted so long as the construction is reasonable), with Sec. & Exch. Comm’n. v. Sloan, 436 U.S.
103, 118 (1978) (rejecting the Securities and Exchange Commission’s interpretation on grounds
that “the mere issuance of consecutive summary suspension orders, without a concomitant exegesis
of the statutory authority for doing so, obviously lacks ‘power to persuade’ as to the existence of
such authority” and that prior administrative practice does not relieve the Court of its “responsibility
to determine whether that practice is consistent with the agency’s statutory authority”); see also
supra Section II.A (describing deference doctrine’s core tenants).
76. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
77. Id. at 866.
78. Id. at 844; see also supra notes 35–37.
79. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844.
80. Id. at 842.
81. Id. at 842–43.
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of the statute.”82 Under Chevron, statutory gaps are presumed to be
delegations of legislative authority to an agency, and reasonable, gap-filling
regulations are given “controlling weight.”83
The Court also expressly addressed the role of judicial review with
respect to agency deference. It forbade courts from engaging in de novo
review by independently interpreting a statute in light of an ambiguity.84 The
Court noted that judges could use the “traditional tools of statutory
construction” to construe Congress’s intent “on the precise question at
issue.”85 Chevron’s rule firmly stayed within the boundaries of section 706
by permitting courts to strike down interpretations deemed to be “arbitrary,
capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.”86
Even though Chevron and subsequent cases applying it established
some limitations on deference to an agency’s interpretations of statutes,87 the
Court’s deference doctrine with respect to interpretations of agency
regulations continued to expand.88 In Martin v. Occupational Safety and
Health Review Commission,89 the Court reasoned that Congress assumed
courts would defer to an agency’s interpretation of their regulations so long
as the interpretation is reasonable since “Congress intended to invest
interpretive power in the administrative actor in the best position to develop”
such expertise.90 In Thomas Jefferson University v. Shalala,91 the Court
noted that there were multiple possible interpretations of a regulation
promulgated pursuant to the Medicare Act, and the Court stated that it owed
“substantial deference” to the Secretary of Health and Human Service’s
construction.92 The Court explained that it was obligated to defer to an
agency’s interpretation that was “as plausible as” other possible

82. Id. at 843.
83. Id. at 844.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 843 n.9.
86. Id. at 844.
87. See, e.g., Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 213 (1988) (refusing to grant
“[d]eference to what appears to be nothing more than an agency’s convenient litigating position”);
Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962) (“The courts may not accept
appellate counsel’s post hoc rationalizations for agency [orders].”).
88. See, e.g., Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 45 (1993) (“As we have often stated,
provided an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations does not violate the Constitution or a
federal statute, it must be given ‘controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent
with the regulation.’” (quoting Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945)));
Lyng v. Payne, 476 U.S. 926, 939 (1986) (“[T]he Court of Appeals’ holding runs roughshod over
the established proposition that an agency’s construction of its own regulations is entitled to
substantial deference.”).
89. 499 U.S. 144 (1991).
90. Id. at 153–57 (“[T]he presumption that Congress delegates interpretative lawmaking power
to the agency rather than to the reviewing court” rests in the agency’s “historical familiarity and
policymaking expertise.”).
91. 512 U.S. 504 (1994).
92. Id. at 512.
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interpretations93 rather than deciding which possible interpretation “best
serves the regulatory purpose.”94 Thomas Jefferson University’s “plausible”
standard, undergirded by the presumption established in Martin, expanded
deference’s scope further beyond what the Court established in Tallman.
3. Deference Reaches Its High Watermark in Auer v. Robbins
The expansion of the agency deference doctrine concluded with Auer v.
Robbins.95 The issue in Auer concerned whether police officers were exempt
from receiving overtime pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”)
because they were salaried workers, not hourly workers. 96 Petitioners
brought suit against the St. Louis Board of Police Commissioners, arguing
that because their pay “could be reduced for a variety of disciplinary
infractions related to the ‘quality or quantity’ of work performed,” they were
not exempt from overtime pay as salaried employees.97 The district court
ruled in favor of the Police Commissioners, finding that they “were paid on
a salary basis,” and the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit,
in relevant part, affirmed.98
Rejecting the petitioner’s argument, the Court deferred to the Secretary
of Labor’s interpretation of “salary basis.”99 Writing for the majority, Justice
Scalia explained that since “the salary-basis test is a creature of the
Secretary’s own regulations, [the Secretary’s] interpretation of it
is . . . controlling unless ‘plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the
regulation.’”100 Since the plain meaning of the phrase “subject to” could
support the Secretary’s interpretation, Justice Scalia, without engaging in an
independent inquiry into the ambiguity, concluded that the “deferential
standard” was “easily met.”101 That the Secretary provided the interpretation
“in the form of a legal brief” did not “make it unworthy of deference,” since
it was not “a ‘post hoc rationalizatio[n]’ advanced by an agency seeking to
defend past agency action against attack.”102 In contrast to Chevron, where
deference is owed only to “reasonable” interpretations of statutes, Auer stood
for a separate, higher degree of deference specific only to agency

93. Id. at 517 (quoting Samaritan Hosp. v. Shalala, 508 U.S. 402, 417 (1993)).
94. Id. at 512.
95. 519 U.S. 452 (1997).
96. Id. at 455.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 455–56; see Auer v. Robbins, 65 F.3d 702 (8th Cir. 1995) (affirming the holding that
certain police officers were exempt from overtime pay and reversing the holding finding two
categories of police sergeants partially non-exempt).
99. Id. at 461.
100. Id. (quoting Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 359 (1989)).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 462 (alteration in original) (quoting Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S.
204, 212 (1988)).
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interpretations of regulations provided in guidance documents, adjudications,
or briefs.103
D. Conservatives Push Back Against Deference’s Expansion
Auer marked the last major expansion of the Court’s deference doctrine.
While in subsequent cases the Court attempted to refine its application of
Auer deference, 104 the Court’s standard of review for an agency’s
interpretation of its regulations remained highly deferential.105 The Court’s
conservatives, recognizing Chevron’s distinction between interpretations of
statutes and regulations, began to reevaluate deference doctrine’s legal
foundation and potentially do away with it altogether.
1. Attempts to Refine Deference Incite a Broader Call to Reexamine
Deference as a Whole
The first major case concerning Auer deference, Christensen v. Harris
County,106 happened to be the only time the Court refused to grant an agency
deference under Auer.107 In Christensen, the Court considered whether to
defer to a Department of Labor opinion letter interpreting regulations
promulgated under the FLSA.108 Explaining that interpretations provided in
opinion letters “lack the force of law,” the Court found Skidmore, rather than
Auer, to be the appropriate standard.109 Justice Thomas cautioned that
granting deference would permit the agency “to create de facto a new
regulation.”110 Justice Scalia disagreed. In Justice Scalia’s view, such
opinion letters warranted deference so long as “it represent[ed] the

103. The Court, however, has declined deference to interpretations it classifies as post-hoc
rationalizations and “convenient litigating position[s].” See Bowen, 488 U.S. at 212–13.
104. See, e.g., Christensen v. Harris Cty., 529 U.S. 576, 588 (2000) (“Auer deference is
warranted only when the language of the regulation is ambiguous. . . . To defer to the agency’s
position would be to permit the agency, under the guise of interpreting a regulation, to create de
facto a new regulation. Because the regulation is not ambiguous on the issue of compelled
compensatory time, Auer deference is unwarranted.”).
105. See, e.g., Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 226 (2002) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
in judgment) (“I do not believe . . . that ‘particular deference’ is owed ‘to an agency interpretation
of “longstanding” duration’ . . . so long as the most recent interpretation is reasonable its antiquity
should make no difference.”).
106. 529 U.S. 576 (2000); see Peter M. Torstensen Jr., The Curious Case of Seminole Rock:
Revisiting Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of Their Ambiguous Regulations, 91 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 815, 826 (2015) (“Three years later, in Christensen v. Harris County, the Court, for
the first and only time, declined to apply Seminole Rock to an agency interpretation of a regulation
on the ground that the interpretation was plainly erroneous.”).
107. Christensen, 529 U.S. at 588.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 587.
110. Id. at 588. Justice Thomas reasoned that since the regulation in question was not
ambiguous, allowing informal interpretive documents to change its meaning allowed the agency to
establish a new regulation altogether. Id.
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authoritative view” of the agency, irrespective of the means by which it is
expressed.111
The following year, the Court refined and narrowed Chevron’s
framework in United States v. Mead.112 Finding that Chevron deference did
not apply to the ruling letters issued by the United States Customs changing
the tariff classification of Mead’s day planners,113 the Court held that before
applying Chevron’s first step, the judge must determine whether Congress
appeared to delegate interpretative authority to the agency. 114 Under Mead
agency interpretations warrant deference only if they are promulgated under
the agency’s congressionally delegated authority and have the effect of
law.115 An interpretation that fails under Mead is only entitled to persuasive
weight under Skidmore.116
In a fierce dissent, Justice Scalia argued the Court “collapse[d]”
Chevron, by “announcing . . . a presumption” against deference. 117 In his
view, Mead’s “background rule” required judges, rather than the agencies, to
evaluate legislative ambiguities.118 This, in turn contravenes Chevron’s
“legal presumption” that the only legal question is whether an interpretation
exceeds “the scope of discretion” conferred by the statutory ambiguity.119 By
delegating interpretative authority to the agencies, Congress intended to
confer them with “the flexibility of interpreting [an] ambiguous statute.”120
Permitting the courts to authoritatively and definitively construe the meaning
of a statute would frustrate the entire purpose behind the APA’s rulemaking
exemptions.121
2. Mounting Conservative Criticism Calls Auer Into Question.
The Court’s first consequential examination of Auer occurred in Talk
America, Inc. v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co.,122 where the Court granted
Auer deference to a Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”)
interpretation
of
regulations
promulgated
pursuant
to
the

111. Id. at 591 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). Justices Breyer and
Ginsburg took issue with Justice Scalia’s dismissal of Skidmore, arguing that it “retain[ed] legal
vitality” and that, where Chevron did not apply, courts were still obligated to “pay particular
attention to the views of an expert agency.” Id. at 596–97 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
112. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
113. Id. at 226–27.
114. Id. at 229.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 235.
117. Id. at 240 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 243.
119. Id. at 242 n.2.
120. Id. at 244.
121. Id. at 241–44.
122. 564 U.S. 50 (2011).
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Telecommunications Act of 1996.123 Despite the fact that the FCC’s
interpretation contradicted a previous order and was presented in an amicus
brief filed by the Commission, the Court still found deference to be
appropriate.124 The Court found that the FCC’s revised definition of
“dedicated transport” was reasonable given the D.C. Circuit’s question of the
old definition, and that the new definition did not conflict with the established
definition of “interconnection.”125
Justice Scalia objected to the Court’s application of Auer, expressly
calling the doctrine into question.126 Though he noted that Auer appeared to
be a “natural corollary” to Chevron, Justice Scalia’s skepticism of Auer’s
validity stems from the key distinction between the doctrines: Chevron
concerns interpretations by the body tasked with administering a statute,
whereas Auer involves interpretations by the body that both writes and
administers the regulation.127 Thus, the separation between the legislative
and executive functions in Chevron are absent in Auer.128 In his view, Auer
deference contravened the “fundamental principles of separation of powers”
by allowing “the person who promulgates a law to interpret it as well.”129
Such comingling of judicial and legislative authority not only cedes power to
the executive branch, but would incentivize agencies to pass vague rules,
thereby “frustrat[ing] the notice and predictability purposes of
rulemaking.”130
The conservative call to revisit Auer gained greater fervor in Decker v.
Northwest Environmental Defense Center.131 In Decker, the Court applied
Auer deference to the EPA’s interpretation of the Industrial Stormwater

123. Id. at 53, 64. Similar to Auer, since no statute or regulation addressed the specific issue in
question, the agency’s amicus curiae brief provided the most authoritative interpretation. Id. at 59;
see also Chase Bank USA, N.A v. McCoy, 562 U.S. 195, 208 (2011) (stating that deference to an
agency’s interpretation of its own regulation advanced in a legal brief is appropriate if the
interpretation is consistent with the regulatory text).
124. Talk America, 564 U.S. at 64. (“[A]lthough the FCC concedes that it is advancing a novel
interpretation of its longstanding interconnection regulations, novelty alone is not a reason to refuse
deference.”).
125. Id. at 61–63.
126. Id. at 68 (Scalia, J., concurring).
127. Id.
128. Id. (explaining how in Chevron, “[t]he legislative and executive functions are not
combined,” but that in Auer both functions are “united in the same person” (quoting MONTESQUIEU,
SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 151–52 (O. Piest ed., T. Nugent transl. 1949))).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 69. Three years later, Justice Alito incorporated Justice Scalia’s critiques into his
opinion in Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142, 156, 158 (2012) (explaining
that deference “creates a risk that agencies will promulgate vague and open-ended regulations” and
that “defer[ing] to the agency’s interpretation . . . would seriously undermine the principle that
agencies should provide regulated parties ‘fair warning of the conduct [a regulation] prohibits or
requires’” (quoting Gates & Fox Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 790 F.2d
154, 156 (D.C. Cir. 1986))).
131. 568 U.S. 597 (2013).
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Rule.132 In dueling footnotes, both parties addressed whether the Court
should revisit Auer.133 In Chief Justice Roberts’ concurring opinion, he
suggested Seminole Rock would be better reconsidered in a case where “the
issue is properly raised and argued,” despite noting the “serious questions”
raised about Auer’s validity.134
Again dissenting, Justice Scalia provided several justifications for doing
away with the Auer doctrine.135 He argued that subsequent cases had failed
to explain Seminole Rock’s “controlling weight” requirement.136 Granting
agencies both the power to prescribe regulations and the power to interpret
those regulations allows them to circumvent notice-and-comment procedures
by promulgating vague rules with plans to later issue interpretations.137
Chevron, unlike Auer, is acceptable because a separate body interprets the
statutory language.138
Two years later, the Court’s decision in Perez v. Mortgage Bankers
Association139 would set the stage for revisiting Auer. In arguing to uphold
precedent that established a right to notice-and-comment procedures when an
agency changes its interpretation of a rule,140 the respondents presented an
alternative argument suggesting that since Auer entitled deference to
interpretive rules, such rules have the force of law.141 The majority did not
fully engage with the respondent’s argument and held that notice-andcomment procedures were unnecessary for amendments or repeals of
interpretative rules.142 The Court’s conservatives, however, viewed the
respondent’s arguments as license to attack Auer, with each writing separate

132. Id. at 613 (“It is well established that an agency’s interpretation need not be the only
possible reading of a regulation—or even the best one—to prevail.”).
133. The respondents suggested revisiting Auer without presenting an argument; the petitioners
disagreed, but also without making an argument. Id. at 615–16 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
134. Id.
135. Addressing the agency expertise argument, Justice Scalia stated that such expertise should
have “nothing to do with who should interpret regulations.” Id. at 618 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Instead, he argues that “the purpose of interpretation is to . . . ‘say what the law is.’” Id. (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
136. Id. at 617–18 (“The first case to apply [Seminole Rock] offered no justification whatever—
just the ipse dixit that ‘the administrative interpretation . . . becomes of controlling weight unless it
is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.’” (quoting Bowles v. Seminole Rock, 325
U.S. 410, 414 (1945) (alteration in original))).
137. Id. at 620 (“[T]he power to prescribe is augmented by the power to interpret . . . .”).
138. Id. (“Congress cannot enlarge its own power through Chevron—whatever it leaves vague
in the statute will be worked out by someone else.”).
139. 135 S. Ct. 1199 (2015). At issue was the validity of a Wage and Hour Division opinion
letter revising a previously held, and subsequently withdrawn, interpretation of wage and hour
regulations for mortgage-loan officers promulgated under the FLSA. Id. at 1204–05.
140. Id. at 1203–04.
141. Id. at 1208 n.4.
142. Id. at 1206, 1208 n.4
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opinions.143 To Justice Scalia, “abandoning Auer and applying the [APA] as
written” would restore the APA’s original balance regarding deference to
agency interpretations.144 Justice Thomas suggested that Seminole Rock
effects “a transfer of judicial power to the Executive Branch,” as deference
precludes judges from exercising their interpretive powers thus undermining
the judiciary’s power “as a check on the political branches.”145 Given the
“serious constitutional questions” raised by Seminole Rock deference, Justice
Thomas expressed that it “should be reconsidered in an appropriate case.”146
III. THE COURT’S REASONING
That “appropriate case” appeared in Kisor v. Wilkie.147 In Kisor, despite
unanimously ruling on the merits to vacate the Federal Circuit Court of
Appeals decision to grant Auer deference to the VA’s interpretation of its
benefits regulations, the Court voted five-to-four to uphold Auer.148 Justice
Kagan, joined by Justices Roberts, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor, limited
Auer by adopting a two-step framework for its application. First, courts
cannot award deference unless, after “exhaust[ing] all the ‘traditional tools’
of construction,” the regulation remains genuinely ambiguous.149 Second, a
reviewing court must evaluate the reasonableness of the agency’s
interpretation, considering “whether the character and context of the agency
interpretation entitles it to controlling weight.”150 On the merits, the Court
concluded that the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals failed to “make a
conscientious effort to determine . . . whether the regulation [had] more than
one reasonable meaning,” and that the lower court concluded too hastily that
Auer deference applied.151
A. Justice Kagan’s Opinion
Writing for the majority, Justice Kagan based her decision on the
presumption that Congress intended courts to defer to agency interpretations
of their own ambiguous rules.152 Justice Kagan noted that agencies have the
authority to apply meaning to their own regulations.153 Agencies are in the

143. Id. at 1217 (Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 1211–1213 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice
Alito simply wrote to say he agreed with his colleagues that Seminole Rock and Auer should be
revisited. Id. at 1210–11 (Alito, J., concurring).
144. Id. at 1213 (Scalia, J., concurring).
145. Id. at 1217 (Thomas, J., concurring).
146. Id. at 1225; see supra Section II.B.1.
147. 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019).
148. Id. at 2408.
149. Id. at 2415.
150. Id. at 2416.
151. Id. at 2423–24.
152. Id. at 2414.
153. Id. at 2412.
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best position to interpret the “original meaning” of a regulation, given their
“direct insight” into the rule’s intended meaning.154 Congress grants the
agencies rulemaking power and authorization to “fill out the statutory
scheme” because agencies are more adept in making specific policy
judgments.155 Given Congress’s preference for the uniform administration156
of federal law, the presumption that Congress intended for deference “reflects
the well-known benefits of uniformity in interpreting genuinely ambiguous
rules.”157 Since the need for uniformity is of particular relevance for highly
technical and complex regulations, deference “serves to ensure consistency
in federal regulatory law.”158
Justice Kagan then addressed the limits of Auer deference. She
cautioned that “Auer deference . . . ‘does not apply in all cases.’”159 Where
the presumption for deference does not apply, no deference is owed and an
agency interpretation merely has persuasive power.160 But, when the
presumption might apply, Justice Kagan explained that deference is only
appropriate if the regulation “is genuinely ambiguous.”161 Without
uncertainty, there is no need for deference. 162 To evaluate whether an
ambiguity exists, the court must look to “the text, structure, history, and
purpose of a regulation” as if there is “no agency to fall back on.”163
Incorporating Chevron’s footnote nine principle, Justice Kagan noted that if
exhausting the entire legal toolkit fails to resolve the interpretative question,
only then may the judge determine a statute to be “genuinely ambiguous.”164
For Auer deference to apply, the agency’s reading of the statutory
language “must . . . be ‘reasonable.’”165
Determining reasonableness
requires the court to “make an independent inquiry into whether the character
and context of the agency interpretation entitles it to controlling weight.”166
Recognizing the open-endedness of such an inquiry, Justice Kagan provided
three guideposts for courts: (1) the interpretation must be the agency’s
154. Id. Justice Kagan noted that “justification has its limits,” such as in circumstances
regarding issues an agency failed to anticipate during the rulemaking or “when lots of time has
passed between the rule’s issuance and its interpretation.” Id.
155. Id. at 2413.
156. Id. (citing Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 568 (1980)).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 2413–14.
159. Id. at 2414 (quoting Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142, 155 (2012)).
160. Id.
161. Id. at 2414–15.
162. Id. at 2415.
163. Id. (quoting Pauley v. Bethenergy Mines, 501 U.S. 680, 707 (1991)).
164. Id. Chevron’s footnote nine principle states that deference is not appropriate if the judge
is able to determine Congress’s meaning after “employing traditional tools of statutory
construction.” Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843, n.9 (1984).
165. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2415 (quoting Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 515
(1994)).
166. Id. at 2416.
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official position, issued by someone with the policymaking authority167; (2)
the interpretation must implicate the substantive expertise of the agency;168
and (3) the interpretation must reflect an agency’s “fair and considered
judgment.”169 Courts should not grant deference to agency interpretations
that constitute “convenient litigating position[s],” “post hoc
rationalization[s],” or new interpretations that may “unfair[ly] surprise
regulated parties.”170
After explaining Auer’s new limits, Justice Kagan then addressed
Auer’s consistency with the APA. Justice Kagan read section 706 of the
APA171 as providing two possibilities for judicial review: de novo review of
the issue, or review of “the agency’s reading for reasonableness.”172 Courts
act consistently with Congress’s presumption when courts conclude and
grant deference to an agency’s reasonable reading of an interpretation.173
Justice Kagan dismissed the argument that Auer violated the
requirements for notice-and-comment rulemaking in section 553 of the
APA.174 Just as the meaning of a legislative rule promulgated through noticeand-comment “remains in the hands of [the court],” so does an agency’s
interpretation of a notice-and-comment rule.175 In either circumstance, she
explained, the court has the final say over an agency’s action.176 Justice
Kagan further rejected the contention that Auer incentivizes agencies to
purposefully write vague regulations onto which “they can later impose
whatever interpretation[s] of [the] rules they prefer.”177 She highlighted the
lack of empirical evidence supporting this claim, and further stated that both
regulators and regulated parties have a shared interest in the clarity and
precision of a regulation.178
Finally, Justice Kagan rejected Kisor’s separation of powers argument
that deference resulted in the vesting of both judicial and legislative powers
into a single branch. 179 Noting that courts still “retain[ed] a firm grip on the
interpretive function,” Justice Kagan stated that the commingling of

167. Id.
168. Id. at 2417.
169. Id. (quoting Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142, 155 (2012)).
170. Id. at 2417–18.
171. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2018) (“To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the
reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory
provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action.”).
172. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2419.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 2420; see also 5 U.S.C § 553 (requiring notice-and-comment procedures for agency
rulemakings).
175. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2420.
176. Id. (“No binding of anyone occurs merely by the agency’s say-so.”).
177. Id. at 2421.
178. Id.
179. Id.
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legislative and judicial functions has been “endemic in agencies . . . ‘since
the beginning of the Republic.’”180 Though agency activities may take on
judicial and legislative forms, they are all “ways of executing a statutory
plan” fully consistent with an agency’s executive power.181
Relying on stare decisis, Justice Kagan provided three reasons against
overruling Auer. First, she noted the long-standing history of “[d]eference to
reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous rules.”182 Second, she
explained that “abandoning Auer . . . would cast doubt on many settled
constructions of rules.”183 Third, though Congress could have amended the
APA at any time to require de novo review, Congress chose to accept the
Court’s “deference regime.”184 Though the power and “far-reaching
influence” of administrative agencies creates opportunities for their power to
be abused, that very possibility further justified reinforcing Auer’s limits,
rather than abandoning the doctrine entirely.185
B. Justice Gorsuch’s Concurrence
Concurring only in the judgment, Justice Gorsuch, joined by Justices
Thomas, Kavanaugh, and Alito, lambasted the majority’s decision to uphold
Auer.186 He described the Court’s decision as “a stay of execution,” which
kept Auer “on life support” all for the purpose of “pretend[ing] to abide stare
decisis.”187 In his view, Auer infringed on the court’s fundamental duty: to
provide an independent judgment on the law.188
First, Justice Gorsuch traced the history of Auer deference, arguing that
the case was “little more than an accident.”189 He stated that Skidmore
“reaffirmed the traditional rule that an agency’s interpretation of the law”
cannot control the court.190 Seminole Rock, in his view, failed to clarify how
much “controlling weight” should be placed on an agency’s interpretation.191
Since the Seminole Rock Court arrived at its decision independent of the
agency’s interpretation, Seminole Rock is more appropriately tied to

180.
(2013)).
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

Id. at 2422 (quoting City of Arlington v. Fed. Commc’n Comm’n, 569 U.S. 290, 304–05
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2422–23.
Id. at 2423.
Id. at 2425 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in judgment).
Id. (emphasis omitted).
Id.
Id. at 2426.
Id.at 2427.
Id. at 2428 (quoting Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945)).
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Skidmore.192 Accordingly, Seminole Rock should be read as suggesting that
agency interpretations are persuasive, but non-binding on the courts.193
Justice Gorsuch then declared Auer to be “the apotheosis of th[e] line of
cases” that inappropriately expanded Seminole Rock’s “controlling weight”
language.194 Since Auer forced judges to set aside their own views on the
law and accept an agency’s reading, even if it “is not the best one,” Auer
deference displaced the judiciary’s interpretative process.195 Further attempts
“to soften Auer’s rigidity” muddled the doctrine and caused “‘widespread
confusion’ about when and how” it might apply.196 These problems provided
ample grounds for overruling Auer.197
Focusing on the APA, Justice Gorsuch described Kisor as the first time
the Court attempted “to square the Auer doctrine” with section 706.198 In his
view, section 706 requires a court to determine legal questions on its own,
rather than under the guidance of executive branch officials.199 Under Justice
Gorsuch’s reading, section 706 only permits de novo review, since deference
lets the agency provide the answer to an interpretative question.200 Justice
Gorsuch further argued that Auer abrogated the distinction between section
553 rules and interpretations.201 If a court affords a new interpretation
“controlling weight,” it functionally becomes a new regulation.202 In his
view, the APA’s requirements imply that an agency cannot amend
substantive rules outside of section 553’s procedures.203 Ultimately, Justice
Gorsuch read the APA as countering Congress’s presumption for agency
deference. 204 In his view, the law of judicial review was “confused” at the
time of the APA’s enactment, and the APA was merely an attempt to clarify
it.205
Justice Gorsuch next addressed the separation of powers argument. He
argued that Auer “compromised” a fundamental legal principle by requiring

192. Id. at 2428–29 (“[In Seminole Rock], the Court declared—for the first time and without
citing any authority—that ‘if the meaning of [the regulation were] in doubt,’ the agency’s
interpretation would merit ‘controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the
regulation.’” (quoting Seminole Rock, 325 U.S. at 414 (1945))).
193. Id. at 2429.
194. Id. (quoting Seminole Rock, 325 U.S. at 414 (1945)).
195. Id. at 2429–30.
196. Id. at 2430 (quoting Kevin Leske, Splits in the Rock: The Conflicting Interpretations of the
Seminole Rock Deference Doctrine by the U. S. Courts of Appeals, 66 ADMIN. L. REV. 787, 832
(2014)).
197. Id. at 2432.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 2434.
202. Id. (quoting Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945)).
203. Id. at 2434–35.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 2436.
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the judge to abide by the agency’s interpretation rather than their own
independent judgment.206 Justice Gorsuch explained that Auer allows
agencies to do what Congress cannot: force the courts to interpret and apply
a law according to another branch’s judgment.207 By requiring adherence to
agency interpretations different from what the judge considers the best
possible reading, deference compromises the judiciary’s independence and
denies litigants the impartial judgment guaranteed by the Constitution.208
Rather than limiting the scope of judicial power, Justice Gorsuch argued,
deference co-opts it.209
Justice Gorsuch then addressed Justice Kagan’s policy arguments.210 To
have “a government of laws,” he explained, we must be “governed by the
public meaning” of an agency’s statutes and regulations, not by the agency’s
intentions.211 Since an agency’s policy judgment is necessarily embodied in
the regulation, judicial interpretation is no more of an act of policymaking
than of law.212 Though he agreed that courts should respect an agency’s
technical expertise, he stated that courts should “remain open to competing
expert and other evidence supplied in an adversarial setting.”213 As to Justice
Kagan’s concern regarding uniformity of the law, Justice Gorsuch expressed
that the “judicial system is more than capable of producing a single, uniform,
and stable interpretation that will last until the regulation is amended or
repealed.”214
Lastly, Justice Gorsuch addressed stare decisis. Analogizing Auer’s
doctrine to other tools of interpretation, he argued that statements about
interpretative methods generally lack the binding force of stare decisis.215 He
questioned Auer’s “practical benefit” over other standards such as
Skidmore.216 Further, the scope of the administrative state heightened the
effect of “deny[ing] citizens an impartial judicial hearing on the meaning of
disputed regulations.”217
Ultimately, Justice Gorsuch viewed overruling Auer as “liberating
courts to decide cases based on their independent judgment.”218 In his view,

206. Id. at 2439.
207. Id. (citing THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 95
(1868)).
208. Id.
209. Id. at 2440.
210. Id. at 2441.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 2443.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 2444.
216. Id. at 2445–46.
217. Id. at 2446–47.
218. Id. at 2447.
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the Court’s decision “le[ft] Auer so riddled with holes” that courts may view
it as similarly constraining as Skidmore.219 He concluded by charging a
future Court to revisit the doctrine and overrule it, either because of the
ineffectiveness of the doctrine’s new limitations or the frustrating effect that
the doctrine has on courts’ ability to provide meaningful and impartial
judicial review of ambiguous regulations.220
C. Chief Justice Roberts’s and Justice Kavanaugh’s Concurrences
Both Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kavanaugh filed separate
concurring opinions. Chief Justice Roberts expressed that nothing in the
Kisor decision directly touched on the issue of Chevron’s applicability.221
Further, he stated “that the distance between the majority and Justice
Gorsuch” is smaller than it seems.222 In Chief Justice Roberts’ view, the
determinative factors for granting deference established by the majority
parallel the reasons identified by Justice Gorsuch that persuade a court to
adhere to an agency’s interpretation.223 Despite the distinctions between
Auer and Skidmore, he suggested “that the cases in which Auer deference is
warranted largely overlap with the cases in which” the refusal to defer would
be unreasonable.224
Justice Kavanaugh, joined by Justice Alito, viewed the rigorous
application of Chevron’s footnote nine as having an effect akin to formally
rejecting Auer.225 Kisor requires judges to “engage in appropriately rigorous
scrutiny of an agency’s interpretation of a regulation,” while “simultaneously
be[ing] appropriately deferential to an agency’s reasonable policy
choices.”226
Justice Kavanaugh’s opinion provides an alternate view of Kisor’s
supposed fatal effect on Auer to that of Justice Gorsuch. Yet, Chief Justice
Roberts’ recognition of Auer’s precedential weight underlies his attempt to
find common ground between the majority and Justice Gorsuch’s views on
deference.

219. Id. at 2448.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 2425 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 2424–25.
225. Id. at 2448 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (“[T]he footnote [nine] principle . . . means that
courts will have no reason or basis to put a thumb on the scale in favor of an agency . . . .”); see
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984) (“If a court, employing
traditional tools of statutory construction, ascertains that Congress had an intention on the precise
question at issue, that intention is the law and must be given effect.”).
226. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2449 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
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IV. ANALYSIS
Despite retaining Auer deference, Kisor stops short of settling the debate
as to whether Chevron deference will survive the Roberts Court in its current
form. In light of Justice Gorsuch’s and Justice Kavanaugh’s efforts to
undermine and erode the administrative state, Section IV.A addresses how
Justice Kagan’s opinion realigns Auer to accord with its historical precedent
and the Chevron framework. Section IV.B argues that Kisor mitigates Auer’s
constitutional concerns by requiring more active judicial scrutiny and due
process than was previously guaranteed under Auer’s standard. Though the
compromise struck by Justice Kagan provides a framework for the Court to
retain some form of deference, Section IV.C discusses how that compromise
also provides a framework for further narrowing Chevron and indicates
further judicial balkanization of administrative agencies. Lastly, Section
IV.D addresses Kisor in the context of increasingly vocalized attacks on the
administrative state and its implications, arguing that deference doctrine’s
future remains unsettled and bleak.
A. Kisor’s Framework Realigns Auer Deference to a Form More
Consistent with Seminole Rock and the Degree of Deference
Intended by the APA.
In adopting a new framework, the Court appropriately realigned Auer
deference to the original test applied in Seminole Rock. Given Udall v.
Tallman’s227 misapplication of Seminole Rock as a single-step test, Justice
Kagan’s opinion corrected the Court’s longstanding misuse of Seminole Rock
by recasting the doctrine as a two-step inquiry.228 Further, despite
conservative claims to the contrary, the Court correctly noted that a two-step
test for reasonableness review comports with the APA, since the Act does not
expressly mandate de novo review.229
1. Justice Kagan’s Opinion Divorces Auer Deference from Udall v.
Tallman’s Application of Seminole Rock and Realigns the
Doctrine with Its Original Framework.
The deference inquiry applied in Auer substantially deviated from the
framework applied by the Seminole Rock Court. In Seminole Rock, the
inquiry focused on the ambiguous provision in question. Yet, the Tallman
Court’s misapplication of Seminole Rock shifted the Court’s focus away from
the ambiguity itself, and more to the reasonableness of the interpretation.
Given Auer marks the most extreme expansion of Tallman’s approach,

227. 380 U.S. 1 (1965).
228. See infra Section IV.A.1.
229. See infra Section IV.A.2.
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Justice Kagan realigns Auer deference with its governing precedent in
Seminole Rock by directing the Court’s focus back to the regulation.
Though Seminole Rock’s “controlling weight” language is most often
read as a single step inquiry, there is an implicit first step.230 For a court to
decide whether an agency’s regulation is “plainly erroneous or inconsistent,”
it first examines the regulation to determine whether the regulation is
ambiguous; then, upon such a conclusion, the court must decide if the
agency’s regulation falls within the boundary of acceptable interpretation.231
Reading Seminole Rock as establishing a two-step inquiry accords with the
Court’s disposition of that case. Unlike the mechanical application of
deference in Auer, the Seminole Rock Court fully and independently engaged
with the text to determine whether the provision was ambiguous before
considering whether the agency’s interpretation justified deference.232 In
essence, Seminole Rock’s inquiry is not unlike that of Chevron.233
Seminole Rock’s two-step framework is strikingly absent in Udall v.
Tallman. Though the Tallman Court evaluated the text to determine whether
the Secretary of Interior’s interpretation was “reasonable,” the Court stopped
short of forming its own conclusion as to the meaning of the regulation.234
The Court’s inquiry focused solely on the reasonableness of the Secretary’s
interpretation of the ambiguity, rather than on resolving the ambiguity
itself.235 Accordingly, the Court’s application of Seminole Rock postTallman almost exclusively centered on the reasonableness of the agency’s
interpretation at the expense of an independent judicial evaluation of the
text.236 Auer exemplifies the most extreme extension of this approach. In
Auer, not only did the Court not evaluate the regulation in question, but its
analysis solely concerned defending the reasonableness of the Secretary’s
interpretation.237
230. See Scott H. Angstreich, Shoring Up Chevron: A Defense of Seminole Rock Deference to
Agency Regulatory Interpretations, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 49, 70–71 (2000) (explaining that
reviewing courts must first determine if a regulation is unambiguous before deciding whether to
grant deference to the agency’s interpretation).
231. Bowles v. Seminole Rock, 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1944).
232. Id. at 415–418; see also Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2428 (2019) (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring in judgment) (explaining that the Seminole Rock Court concluded the OPA’s regulation
was permissible “[o]nly after reaching that conclusion based on its own independent analysis”).
233. Compare Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842, 865
(1984) (“First, always, is the question of whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise
question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter.”), with Seminole
Rock, 325 U.S. at 414 (“The intention of Congress . . . may be relevant in the first instance in
choosing between various constructions.” (emphasis added)).
234. Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 22–23 (1965) (“[N]either [the Court of Appeals’ holding]
nor this Court’s affirmance in any way casts doubt upon the reasonableness of the Secretary’s
interpretation of the orders at bar . . . .”).
235. Id. at 18–19.
236. See, e.g., Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 513–17 (1994) (framing its
evaluation of the ambiguity around the reasonableness of the Secretary’s interpretation).
237. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461–62 (1997).
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Thus, the Auer Court’s application of Seminole Rock is wholly distinct
from deference doctrine’s original application. Unlike in Seminole Rock,
where an agency’s interpretation is controlling based on its consistency with
the statutory scheme, Auer assumes that the interpretation is controlling
unless demonstrated otherwise.238 As compared to Seminole Rock, a judge’s
exclusive concern under Auer is the reasonableness of the interpretation
rather than the meaning of the ambiguity.239 The shift in focus away from
the regulation’s language results in a lower degree of judicial scrutiny, as the
judge is no longer independently interpreting the meaning of the
regulation.240
Kisor effectively realigns Auer with Seminole Rock. Kisor’s first
requirement—that the regulation remain genuinely ambiguous after a judge
fails to resolve the ambiguity using “all the ‘traditional tools’ of
construction”—forces the judge to engage directly with the text beyond the
frame of an agency’s interpretation.241 This requirement, similar to
Chevron’s first step, is functionally similar to the Court’s approach in
Seminole Rock.242 Kisor’s second requirement—reasonableness review— is
explicitly grounded in the review standard established by Chevron.243
Though the “plainly erroneous or inconsistent” standard in Seminole Rock is
arguably more deferential than Chevron’s reasonableness standard, in
practice courts have applied the two standards in a similar fashion.244 Thus,
Kisor clarifies how the Seminole Rock standard should be applied by aligning
Auer’s deferential standard with Chevron. Kisor’s framework reestablishes

238. See John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency
Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 629 (1996) (describing a post-Udall
application of Seminole Rock where “the Court made no effort to decide how it would have
[independently] construed the regulation”).
239. See Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597, 614 (2013) (focusing on whether the
agency’s interpretation is reasonable rather than on whether it is the best reading to clarify the
ambiguity).
240. See Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1219–20 (2015) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in judgment); see also Manning, supra note 238, at 639 (arguing that Seminole Rock
involves “no independent interpretive check” of an administrative agency’s “lawmaking”).
241. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2415 (2019) (quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res.
Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843, n.9 (1984)).
242. See Kevin O’Leske, Between Seminole Rock and a Hard Place: A New Approach to
Agency Deference, 46 CONN. L. REV. 227, 245–46 (2013) (explaining that in Seminole Rock, “the
Court performed a much more searching inquiry to ascertain the meaning of the regulation than the
plain language of the test it purported to apply”); see also Angstreich, supra note 230, at 70–71
(“[A]lthough formally stated as a one-step test, Seminole Rock implicitly involves a preliminary
analysis that mirrors Chevron step one.”).
243. Kisor, 588 U.S. at 2416 (“Under Auer, as under Chevron, the agency’s reading must fall
‘within the bounds of reasonable interpretation.’” (quoting City of Arlington v. Fed. Commc’n
Comm’n, 569 U.S. 290, 296 (2013))).
244. See Angstreich, supra note 230, at 70, n.87–88 and accompanying text (“[I]n practice,
courts review agency interpretations of their own regulations under a standard nearly identical to
that at Chevron step two.”).
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Seminole Rock deference as initially applied, rather than as interpreted by
Tallman and Auer.
2. Kisor is Consistent with the APA’s Judicial Review Provisions
Since the APA Does Not Exclusively Require De Novo Review of
Agency Decisions.
Kisor comports with the degree of deference Congress intended when it
enacted the Administrative Procedure Act. Judicial deference to agency
expertise began well before enactment of the APA.245 As the administrative
state expanded, courts progressively began adopting a more deferential
attitude towards agency findings.246 During the New Deal and World War II
era, courts recognized and applied varying degrees of deference when
reviewing agency findings of law as well as fact.247 Since the APA was
expressly intended to “restate[] the present law as to the scope of judicial
review,” that scope encapsulated some degree of judicial deference. 248
Despite Justice Gorsuch’s contentions, section 706 does not mandate de
novo review.249 Section 706 requires reviewing courts to “decide all relevant
questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and
determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action,”250
The section’s broad framing gives a judge discretion in how to decide such
legal questions.251 Justice Gorsuch’s argument uses an unduly narrow
construction of section 706 that mischaracterizes deference’s central legal
question and proceeds under a false premise.252 Section 706 permits two
types of review: de novo review and “reading for reasonableness” review.253
The Attorney General’s Committee on Administrative Procedures stated:

245. See supra Sections II.A–B.
246. See supra notes 37–40 and accompanying text; see also John J. Coughlin, The History of
the Judicial Review of Administrative Power and the Future of Regulatory Governance, 38 IDAHO
L. REV. 89, 110 (2001) (“While the Supreme Court was firmly committed to the availability of
judicial review of agency actions to individuals who incurred injury to a legal right, the limited
scope of the review permitted the administrative agencies wide latitude.”).
247. See e.g., Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Hearst Publ’ns, 311 U.S. 111, 130–31 (1944) (stating
that questions of statutory interpretation are appropriate, so long as courts “giv[e] appropriate weight
to the judgment of those whose special duty is to administer the questioned statute”).
248. ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL, supra note 61, at 108.
249. See supra notes 198–200.
250. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2018).
251. See Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron as Law, 107 GEO. L.J. 1613, 1642 (2019) (“The APA does
not say whether and when courts should defer to agency interpretations of law.”).
252. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2433 (2019) (arguing that the APA’s silence on whether
to defer when interpreting regulations suggests that “Congress told courts to ‘determine’ those
matters for themselves”). But see The Honorable Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to
Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 514 (1989) (“[O]ne provision of the
[APA] itself seems to have been based upon the quite mistaken assumption that questions of law
would always be decided de novo by the courts.”).
253. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2419.
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Even on questions of law [independent judicial] judgment seems
not to be compelled. The question of statutory interpretation might
be approached by the court de novo and given the answer which
the court thinks to be the “right interpretation.” Or the court might
approach it, somewhat as a question of fact, to ascertain, not the
“right interpretation,” but only whether the administrative
interpretation has substantial support.254
“Substantial support” means “reasonableness review.”255 Thus, the
legal question central to Chevron deference—whether an agency’s
interpretation is reasonable—is fully permissible, despite the fact that
Chevron seems to eschew de novo review.256 With Chevron deference, the
legal question concerns whether Congress has delegated interpretive
authority to the administrative agency; an affirmative finding triggers
reasonableness review.257 Similarly, Kisor’s reasonableness review was
triggered by the Court’s evaluation as to “whether the character and context
of the agency interpretation entitles it to controlling weight.”258 Just as in
Chevron, whether an agency’s interpretation of a regulation is entitled to
deference under Kisor is a question of law fully within the scope of review
intended by section 706 of the APA.259
Ultimately, the Court appropriately responded to the criticism that Auer
was divorced from its precedent by establishing a framework for deference
that more closely tracks Seminole Rock’s inquiry. Since Congress intended
to restate the law of judicial review to agency actions in the APA,260 Kisor’s
reasonableness review comports with the degree of deference intended by the
APA.

254. S. DOC. NO. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 90–91 (1941).
255. See Sunstein, supra note 251, at 1647–48 (explaining how the APA’s drafters suggested
courts might accept an agency’s interpretation as long as it is reasonable, even if it is not the best
interpretation).
256. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984)
(“[L]egislative regulations are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or
manifestly contrary to the statute.”); see also Sunstein, supra note 251, at 1646–47 (describing the
similarities between the Committee’s explanation of the APA’s scope of judicial review and
Chevron).
257. See JERRY L. MASHAW, REASONED ADMINISTRATION AND DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY:
HOW ADMINISTRATIVE LAW SUPPORTS DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT 29 (2018) (explaining how
Chevron deference comports with section 706 of the APA).
258. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2416.
259. See Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071,
2104–05 (1990) (“The reasonableness inquiry should probably be seen as similar to the inquiry into
whether the agency’s decision is ‘arbitrary’ or ‘capricious’ within the meaning of the APA.”); see
also Angstreich, supra note 230, at 86 (explaining the similarities between Chevron and Seminole
Rock).
260. See ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL, supra note 61, at 108.
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B. Kisor’s Heightened Judicial Scrutiny Redresses Constitutional
Concerns Undergirding Auer’s Criticisms
Unlike the judiciary’s limited inquiry under Auer, Kisor’s framework
mandates independent judicial inquiry into a regulation’s meaning. This
framework effectively addresses the criticism that deference infringes on the
Constitution’s guarantee of an impartial judgment to those before the court.261
Active judicial scrutiny also remedies the separation of powers concerns of
Auer deference’s critics by narrowing the circumstances in which deference
applies, thereby granting the judge greater discretion in determining whether
an interpretation is reasonable or not.262
1. Kisor Mitigates Due Process Concerns by Requiring More Active
Judicial Scrutiny of an Ambiguous Regulation
Kisor’s framework rebuts Justice Gorsuch’s chief criticism that
deference infringes on the judge’s responsibility “to say what the law is.”263
By requiring the judge to exhaust the interpretative toolkit and find a
“genuine ambiguity” before deferring, Kisor mandates that the judge
construe the text independently from the agency’s reading and grants the
judge a degree of independence absent in Auer.264
Kisor’s high standard for ambiguity affords judges great leeway in
deciding whether deference is owed.265 If the judge agrees that the agency’s
reading is the “best reading” of the statute, deference is appropriate.266 But,
if the judge disagrees, Kisor provides the judge greater freedom to avoid a
result that may be contrary to the law’s intended meaning.267 Kisor’s
framework and limitations prohibit a judge from engaging in the very sort of

261. See infra Section IV.B.1.
262. See infra Section IV.B.2.
263. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803); see Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2440
(Gorsuch, J., concurring in judgment) (explaining that Auer “seeks to coopt the judicial power by
requiring an Article III judge to decide a case before him according to principles that he believes do
not accurately reflect the law” (emphasis in original)); see also Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n,
135 S. Ct. 1199, 1219 (2015) (“Seminole Rock deference . . . precludes judges from independently
determining [the meaning of the law].”); Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597, 618 (2013)
(explaining that the aim of interpretation is “[n]ot to make policy, but to determine what policy has
been made”).
264. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2415 (explaining that the Court’s application of Auer transformed
Seminole Rock deference into a more “reflexive” doctrine and that “a court must ‘carefully
consider[]’ the text, structure, history, and purpose of a regulation, in all the ways it would if it had
no agency to fall back on” (alteration in original)).
265. Id. (“[A] court cannot wave the ambiguity flag just because it found the regulation
impenetrable on the first read.”).
266. Id. at 2416–18.
267. Id. at 2418 (“[T]his Court has cabined Auer’s scope in varied and critical ways—and in
exactly that measure, has maintained a strong judicial role in interpreting rules.”); see id. at 2442
(Gorsuch, J., concurring in judgment) (advocating for “redirecting the judge’s interpretative task
back to its roots” to ensure proper scrutiny over the law).
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mechanical application of deference that underlies the Court’s conservatives’
concerns.268 Ultimately, the active judicial scrutiny mandated in Kisor
remedies Justice Gorsuch’s concern that Auer removes the judge from their
Article III role and infringes on the legal process the Constitution guarantees
to litigants.269
2. Kisor’s Heightened Judicial Scrutiny Mitigates Separation of
Powers Issues
In light of the criticism that Auer deference permits an agency to
interpret its own rules, Kisor created a heightened judicial scrutiny that
mitigated such concerns for three reasons.270 First, unlike Auer’s broad and
highly deferential framework, Kisor still requires a judge to exercise their
independent judgment when construing a statute.271 Applying Kisor
necessarily precludes the type of mechanical, “hands-off” jurisprudence that
arguably aggrandized agency power at the judiciary’s expense. 272
Second, Auer’s criticisms are rooted in a false premise: that Auer
deference leads agencies to circumvent notice-and-comment rulemaking by
issuing vague regulations supplemented by guidance documents exempt
from APA procedural requirements.273 Implied in this “self-delegation”
argument is an inherent suspicion and skepticism of agencies and their
experts.274 Yet, as Justice Kagan rightly notes, “no real evidence backs up”

268. Id. at 2421 (majority opinion) (explaining that Kisor’s limitations ensure that “courts retain
a firm grip on the interpretive function”).
269. Article III charges the judiciary with resolving civil cases and controversies arising under
the laws of the United States, thus the Constitution entitles those before the courts review by a body
separate from the political branches. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
270. See, e.g., Talk America, Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 564 U.S. 50, 68 (2011) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in judgment) (“It seems contrary to fundamental principles of separation of powers to
permit the person who promulgates a law to interpret it as well.”).
271. Compare Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2415 (stating that “a court must ‘carefully consider’ the text,
structure, history, and purpose of a regulation” before determining it is ambiguous), with Auer v.
Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (“Because the salary-basis test is a creature of the Secretary’s
own regulations, his interpretation of it is, under our jurisprudence, controlling unless ‘plainly
erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.’” (quoting Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens
Council, 490 U.S. 332, 359 (1989))).
272. Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1220 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring
in judgment) (arguing that Seminole Rock deference “undermines the judicial ‘check’ on the
political branches”).
273. See Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2440–41 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in judment) (arguing that an
“agency’s failure to write a clear regulation winds up increasing its power, allowing it to both write
and interpret rules that bear the force of law”); see also Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 568 U.S.
597, 620 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (explaining how Auer deference encourages agencies to
circumvent notice-and-comment procedures by issuing vaguely framed regulations intended to be
subsequently fleshed out by issuing interpretations (citing Robert A. Anthony, The Supreme Court
and the APA: Sometimes They Just Don’t Get It, 10 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 1, 11–12 (1996))).
274. See Manning, supra note 238, at 655–56 (arguing “an agency’s right of self-interpretation
should have an untoward effect upon its incentive to speak precisely and transparently when it
promulgates regulations”).
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such an assertion.275 Further, agencies have an active interest in writing clear
regulations.276 Ambiguity is a threat to the long-term legitimacy of the
regulatory scheme and frustrates effective agency administration.277
Third, the “self-delegation” argument ignores the fact that agencies are
merely clarifying already established legislative rules when they issue
guidance documents.278 In drafting guidance documents, an agency is
engaging in an extension of its delegated authority for crafting regulations,
rather than “enlarg[ing] its own power” by interpreting what it previously
wrote.279 Precise and specific regulations are costly to adopt and enforce.280
Further, agencies may not be able to anticipate every circumstance in which
a rule is applied.281 The ability to issue subsequent interpretations to
established regulations provides agencies with much needed flexibility in
navigating the tradeoffs between costs, clarity, and congruence. 282 An
agency’s ability to adopt a rule due to an unforeseen circumstance is
necessarily implied in an agency’s delegated authority, as doing so is required
in their exercise of the “executive Power”283 and responsibility in “executing
a statutory plan.”284 Agencies have broad discretion regarding the procedures
275. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2407; see also Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, The Unbearable
Rightness of Auer, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 297, 308 n.45 (2017) (describing how an analysis of over
2000 rules did not uncover any evidence of them being written intentionally ambiguous).
276. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2421 (explaining how vagueness increases the likelihood a rule may
be overturned and makes established rules more susceptible to reinterpretation by “future
administrations, with different views”); see also Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 275, at 308–09
(stating that both internal and external pressures compel clarity in regulations).
277. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2421; see also Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 275, at 309 (explaining
how “Auer actually incentivizes clarity” because “[i]f an agency leaves a regulation ambiguous,
[then the agency] cannot be certain that a subsequent interpretation will be made by an
administration with the same or similar values”).
278. See Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 275, at 313 (“When an agency makes valid legislative
rules, those rules bind the agency itself as well as all the world.”).
279. Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597, 620 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis
omitted); see also Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 275, at 313–14 (“In the standard Auer case,
there is nothing at all arbitrary about the agency’s decision to specify, through interpretation, what
a legislative rule means, not least because the agency is often answering a question that it did not
anticipate.”).
280. See Angstreich, supra note 230, at 114 (“When a regulation is specified in great detail it
can become difficult to identify the applicable regulatory subprovision and, therefore, more costly
to enforce and less likely to induce compliance. Increased clarity also adds to the costs of
promulgating the rule.”).
281. See Cass Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953, 993 (1995) (“Those who
issue a rule cannot know the full range of situations to which the rule will be applied, and in the new
circumstances, the rule may be hopelessly outmoded.”).
282. See Angstreich, supra note 230, at 114–15 (explaining the comparative advantages of
vague and precise rules, and arguing that Seminole Rock deference does little to incentivize an
agency’s choice between vagueness and precision).
283. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1; City of Arlington v. Fed. Commc’n Comm’n, 569 U.S. 290,
305, n.4 (2013) .
284. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2422 (2019); see United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S.
218, 229 (2001) (“[I]t can still be apparent from the agency’s generally conferred authority . . . that
Congress would expect the agency to be able to speak with the force of law when it addresses
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used to implement regulations within their statutory authority.285
Accordingly, the decision whether to interpret the meaning of a regulation
through a guidance document, rather than promulgate an entirely new rule, is
a procedural decision about how to answer an unforeseen question under the
current statutory scheme.286
Kisor departs from Auer’s mechanical application by conditioning
deference on a judge’s independent inquiry into the reasonableness of an
interpretation.287 Kisor redirects the judge’s focus away from the agency’s
interpretation and towards the text of the regulation, thereby granting litigants
the process guaranteed in the Constitution and limiting the potential
aggrandizement of agency power.
C. Kisor’s Double-Edged Sword: Defending Expert Agencies While
Providing the Framework for Their Erosion.
Kisor seems to exalt the administrative state’s institutional
competencies and bolster arguments justifying the reasons to vest
interpretative authority with the expert agencies. 288 Yet, Kisor provides a
framework for the Court to import future restrictions onto Chevron, thereby
eroding the administrative state’s effectiveness and authority.289 Though it is
unlikely a majority on the Court would vote to abrogate Chevron given its
longevity as precedent, Kisor suggests that, should Chevron be revisited, the
Court likely would further narrow and limit the doctrine’s applicability.290

ambiguity in the statute or fills a space in the enacted law . . . .”); Martin v. Occupational Safety &
Health Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144, 153 (1991) (“[W]e presume here that Congress intended to invest
interpretative power in the administrative actor in the best position to develop [regulatory
standards].”); Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974) (“The power of an administrative agency
to administer a congressionally created . . . program necessarily requires the formulation of policy
and the making of rules to fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress.”); see also City of
Arlington, 539 U.S. at 327 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“An agency’s interpretive authority, entitling
the agency to judicial deference, acquires its legitimacy from a delegation of lawmaking power from
Congress to the Executive.”).
285. See Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Chenery Corp. (“Chenery II”), 332 U.S. 194, 201–03 (1947)
(“[A]n administrative agency must be equipped to act either by general rule or by individual order.
To insist upon one form of action to the exclusion of the other is to exalt form over necessity.”).
286. Agencies should have flexibility in deciding which tools are best suited to resolve
unforeseen problems related to rules they issue. Given that such procedural decisions—determining
which tools to use— are context dependent, the Court recognizes that such decisions are best left to
agency discretion. See, e.g., Nat’l. Labor Relations Bd. v. Bell Aerospace CO. Div. of Textron,
Inc., 416 U.S. 267, 291–94 (1974) (explaining how procedural decisions, such as whether to
“announc[e] new principles” through rulemaking or adjudication, are discretionary and warrant
deference); Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 275, at 313–14 (arguing that an agency’s procedural
decisions do not alter the boundaries of their authority).
287. See supra Section II.D.
288. See infra Section IV.C.1.
289. See infra Section IV.C.2.
290. See infra Section IV.C.3.
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1. The Institutional Competencies of Administrative Agencies Make
Them Better Positioned to Clarify Regulatory Ambiguities.
Both Congress and the courts have recognized the pragmatism of letting
the agencies clarify ambiguities in the statutes and regulations that they
administer.291 Agencies’ subject matter expertise, fact-finding abilities,
familiarity with policy goals, and experience in implementing and enforcing
regulations underlie the appropriateness of judicial deference. 292 Vesting
agency actors with implementation responsibilities ensures that the laws are
administered in an effective and consistent manner.293 Congress intended
agencies to fulfil the responsibility of fleshing out congressional commands
and developing them into regulations that serve Congress’s legislative
aims.294 As the Court noted in Mead, an agency’s “conferred authority”
suggests that “Congress would expect the agency to be able to speak with the
force of law when it addresses ambiguity in the statute or fills a space in the
enacted law.”295 An agency’s experience with implementing and enforcing
its regulations provides greater expertise when resolving regulatory
ambiguities. The Court has justified deference based on an agency’s
exclusive responsibility of enacting and implementing its regulations.296

291. See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001) (explaining “that
Congress would expect the agency to be able to speak with the force of law when it addresses
ambiguity in the statute”).
292. See Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144, 150–51 (1991)
(“Because applying an agency’s regulation to complex or changing circumstances calls upon the
agency’s unique expertise and policymaking prerogatives, we presume that the power
authoritatively to interpret its own regulations is a component of the agency’s delegated lawmaking
powers.”); see MASHAW, supra note 257, at 131 (explaining how an agency’s scientific and
technical expertise and experience in “implementing broad goals in heterogeneous contexts and in
consultation with diverse interested parties and institutions” is central to Chevron’s “insistence” on
deference).
293. See Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994) (“This broad deference
is all the more warranted when . . . the regulation concerns ‘a complex and highly technical
regulatory program.’” (quoting Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 697 (1991))); Ford
Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 568 (1980) (“[L]anguage in the legislative history
evinces a decided preference for resolving interpretive issues by uniform administrative decision,
rather than piecemeal through litigation.”).
294. See Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2413 (2019) (“[T]he presumption that Congress
intended Auer deference stems from the awareness that resolving genuine regulatory ambiguities
often ‘entail[s] the exercise of judgment grounded in policy concerns.’” (quoting Thomas Jefferson
Univ., 512 U.S. at 512)); Martin, 499 U.S. at 153 (finding that “historical familiarity and
policymaking expertise” suggest a presumption “that Congress delegates interpretative lawmaking
power to the agency rather than to the reviewing court”); Fed. Commc’n Comm’n v. Pottsville
Broad. Co., 309 U.S. 134, 146 (1940) (“Congress which creates and sustains these agencies must
be trusted to correct whatever defects experience may reveal.”); see also LANDIS, supra note 1, at
70 (“Despite the outcry from time to time by individual members of the Congress against the grant
of powers to the administrative to formulate regulatory provisions, on the whole that process today
has the respect of members of the legislative branch . . . .”).
295. Mead, 533 U.S. at 229.
296. See, e.g., Martin, 499 U.S. at 152 (explaining that the Secretary of Labor’s experience in
enforcing the Occupational Safety and Health Act underlies the presumption that Congress intended
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Further, the Court has long acknowledged that agencies are best equipped to
resolve statutory ambiguities because of their experience in administering
regulations.297
Granting agencies interpretive authority allows for
consistency in the regulatory scheme and provides clearer notice to those
subject to the regulations.
Justice Gorsuch’s contention that judges are “capable of producing a
single, uniform, and stable interpretation” contravenes the practical
understanding that “judges are most likely to come to divergent conclusions
when they are least likely to know what they are doing.”298 Unless the judge
is an expert in the subject matter, the best interpretation of an ambiguity likely
stems from the most knowledgeable authority.299 Deferring to the agency’s
expertise is not an abdication of judicial responsibility, but rather a pragmatic
understanding that proper administration of the law necessarily involves
adjusting to the judiciary’s limited competencies to ensure that the law
functions as Congress intended.300
Justice Kagan appropriately recognized that the policymaking
responsibilities and expertise delegated to agencies justifies deference. The
effectiveness of a regulatory scheme depends on an agency’s regulations
being clear and long-lasting, yet the executive branch’s responsiveness to the
electorate requires agencies to have a degree of flexibility in how these
schemes are administered.301 An agency’s expertise in the subject of a statute
informs its ability to adopt regulations to changing political tides or to adapt

the Secretary to have interpretative power); Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) (“We have long recognized that considerable weight should be accorded
to an executive department’s construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer.”); Nat’l
Labor Relations Bd. v. Hearst Publ’n, 322 U.S. 111, 130 (1944) (“Everyday experience in the
administration of the statute gives [an agency] familiarity with the circumstances and backgrounds
of employment relationships in various industries . . . . The experience thus acquired must be
brought frequently to bear on the question who is an employee under the Act.”)
297. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 234 (justifying deference to agency interpretations “given the
‘specialized experience and broader investigations and information’ available to the agency” and
the importance of uniformity in a regulation’s meaning and application (quoting Skidmore v. Swift,
323 U.S. 134, 139 (1944))); see also Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402, 412 (1941) (“Where, as here, a
determination has been left to an administrative body, this delegation will be respected and the
administrative conclusion left untouched.”).
298. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2443 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in judgment); id. at 2414 (majority
opinion).
299. Banks Miller & Brett Curry, Experts Judging Experts: The Role of Expertise in Reviewing
Agency Decision Making, 38 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 55, 69 (2013) (concluding “that subject matter
expertise makes federal appellate judges significantly less likely to defer to an agency than their
nonexpert peers”).
300. See Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 275, at 320 (“Because of the need to resolve technical
issues, and because of the plain advantages of accountability, the balance cuts hard in the direction
of Auer.”).
301. See Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2413; see also MASHAW, supra note 257, at 173–74 (arguing that
delegating to agencies the responsibility to make choices based on facts and circumstances that are
unavailable to Congress is a policy choice).
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a statute to changing factual circumstances.302 By noting the judiciary’s
limitations as a generalist branch whose policymaking responsibilities are
restrained by the separation of powers doctrine, Justice Kagan grounds her
reasoning in the pragmatic understanding that the judiciary’s limited
competencies and expertise justify trusting the experts.303
2.

Kisor’s Framework Indicates How the Court May Further
Narrow Deference Doctrine

Though Kisor’s framework is identical to Chevron’s, the express
limitations on its applicability make the doctrine far narrower. The markers
provided to guide a court’s reasonableness review limit the circumstances in
which deference may be granted.304 Since Kisor heightens the burden for an
agency seeking deference, the markers serve the purpose of ensuring that the
agency not only acted in accordance with its delegated authority, but that it
acted reasonably and consistently.305 While Chevron has been modified in
order to ensure that Congress intended to vest interpretive authority in an
agency, its reasonableness prong still remains somewhat broad.306
Accordingly, applying Kisor’s guideposts to Chevron would narrow the
deference doctrine by restraining the broadness of Chevron’s reasonableness
review. In turn, judges would have far greater discretion in deciding whether
Chevron applies. As will be discussed in Section IV.C.3, the Court’s current
composition suggests that it is interested in reconsidering Chevron. Should
it choose to do so, Kisor’s limits provide a means to narrow the doctrine
without eliminating it.
3.

Kagan’s Caution and Conservative Skepticism Render
Deference’s Future Unsettled and Bleak

Despite Justice Kagan’s rosy view of agency expertise, the majority
opinion cautions courts from relying on agency expertise. Her opinion

302. See Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2413; Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 865 (1984) (explaining that since agencies are politically accountable under the executive
branch, it is appropriate for them to make policy choices that Congress either implicitly or explicitly
left for the agency to resolve).
303. See MASHAW, supra note 257, at 124–31 (explaining how agency expertise and political
accountability underpin the reasoning in favor of agency deference).
304. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2416.
305. See O’Leske, supra note 242, 275–85 (proposing four context-dependent factors to
determine whether deference is owed similar to those subsequently established in Kisor and arguing
such an approach would reduce “incentive[s] to promulgate vague regulations,” diminish
“opportunit[ies] to re-interpret a regulation routinely without adequate notice,” and “promote muchneeded certainty for the public”).
306. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 257 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(“Chevron sets forth an across-the-board presumption, which operates as a background rule of law
against which Congress legislates. . . . Any resolution of the ambiguity by the administering agency
that is authoritative . . . must be accepted by the courts if it is reasonable.” (emphasis added)).
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weighs deference’s practicality against the judiciary’s ability “to perform
their reviewing and restraining functions.”307 In pronouncing Auer’s limits,
Justice Kagan lends credence to the arguments of those fearful and suspicious
of the administrative state.308 Kisor’s requirement that an interpretation must
“emanate” from those tasked with the ability “to make authoritative policy in
the relevant context” suggests that, without such limits, any agency
decisionmaker could essentially make binding law.309 Though, on the
surface, such a limit is absolutely reasonable, it begs the question as to who
decides whether an agency actor has such authority: the agency or the judge?
By tasking the judge to resolve this question, Kisor implies a degree of
distrust in an agency’s decision to internally delegate its vested authority.310
Further, inherent in Justice Kagan’s admission that “the administrative
realm is vast and varied,” is a suspicion of bureaucracy.311 Accordingly, the
“character and context” limit suggests that not all reasonable interpretations
are contextually appropriate.312 Yet, if an agency is best positioned for
interpreting and administering its statutory scheme, would it not know
whether, under certain circumstances, Congress presumed its interpretations
to warrant some degree of deference?313
Ultimately, the tension in Justice Kagan’s opinion between deference
and oversight not only reflects her cautious view of the administrative state
but also results in a compromise that does little to prevent future efforts to
undermine the administrative state.
While Justice Gorsuch has been particularly vocal in calling for the
abrogation of deference doctrine entirely, his conservative colleagues have
307. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2415.
308. Id. at 2418.
309. Id. at 2416; see Adrian Vermeule, Bureaucracy and Distrust: Landis, Jaffe, and Kagan on
the Administrative State, 130 HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2481 (2017) (describing how Justice Kagan’s
view of administrative legitimacy establishes the President “as a nationally elected check on the ills
of bureaucracy”); see also Judge Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV.
L. REV. 2118, 2151 (2016) (describing how agency decisionmakers can use Chevron to pursue their
own policy goals).
310. The expansive scope of the administrative state and its oversight difficulties increases the
likelihood for abuses of power and illegitimate action. See Justice Elena Kagan, Presidential
Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2264 (2001) (“[M]odels of administration . . . relying on
internal expertise provoke serious questions about the quality, no less than the legitimacy, of agency
action.” (emphasis added)); Adrian Vermeule, Optimal Abuse of Power, 109 Nw. U.L. Rev. 673,
677 (2015) (arguing that the size of the administrative state and difficulty in enforcement “ensure
that some positive rate of abuse is inevitable”).
311. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2416.
312. Kisor narrowly defines “character and context” by requiring that an interpretation be a “fair
and reasoned,” “official” position on a matter within an agency’s designated substantive expertise.
Id. at 2416–17.
313. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001) (“[I]t can still be apparent from
the agency’s generally conferred authority and other statutory circumstances that Congress would
expect the agency to be able to speak with the force of law when it addresses ambiguity. . . .”); see
also LANDIS, supra note 1, at 61 (explaining that agencies are “dependent on the legislative and
executive for an extension of [their] existing powers” if circumstances so require).
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signaled a willingness to consider the issue.314 Justice Thomas likely would
join Justice Gorsuch in eliminating Chevron entirely, as evidenced by his
concurrence in Michigan v. EPA.315 Justice Kavanaugh’s writings on
Chevron indicate that he also favors overturning Chevron. Like his
conservative colleagues, Justice Kavanaugh has argued that judicial
deference poses separation of powers concerns.316 However, his view of the
doctrine is somewhat more nuanced than that of Justices Gorsuch and
Thomas. Justice Kavanaugh has suggested that there are two circumstances
where deference “makes a lot of sense:”317 first, where the statute explicitly
delegates interpretive authority to the agency; and second, where a statute
“uses broad, open-ended terms like ‘reasonable,’ ‘appropriate,’ ‘feasible,’ or
‘practicable.’”318 Considering how Kisor’s limits could be applied to
Chevron, Justice Kavanaugh would likely be open to restraining the doctrine,
but in a manner where its application is so circumscribed that it would be
rendered functionally null.319
Chief Justice Roberts, though unlikely to join in an opinion which
abrogates Chevron, seems to be open to revisiting and narrowing the
doctrine.320 His recently developed “major questions doctrine” has already
narrowed the circumstances where deference may apply.321 His dissent in

314. See Matthew C. Turk & Karen E. Woody, Justice Kavanaugh, Lorenzo v. SEC, and the
Post-Kennedy Supreme Court, 71 ADMIN. L. REV. 193, 246–49 (2019) (arguing that while Justices
Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Thomas seek to eliminate Chevron, Justices Breyer, Roberts, and Alito
favor retaining, but limiting the doctrine).
315. 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712 (2015) (Thomas, J. concurring) (arguing that Chevron deference’s
“transfer” of interpretative authority “is in tension with Article III’s Vesting Clause”); see also Perez
v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, 575 U.S. 92, 1213–15 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment)
(lambasting the Court’s tradition of deference and concluding that, while stare decisis is essential
to the legal system’s stability, “stare decisis is only an ‘adjunct’ of our duty as judges to decide by
our best lights what the Constitution means” (quoting McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 812
(2010) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)))).
316. The Honorable Brett M. Kavanaugh, The Role of the Judiciary in Maintaining the
Separation of Powers, HERITAGE FOUND. LECTURE, 8–9, (Oct. 25, 2017)
https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2018-02/HL1284.pdf
(arguing
that
Chevron’s
indeterminacy is “antithetical to the neutral, impartial rule of law”).
317. Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2118, 2152
(2016).
318. Id. at 2153–54. In these cases, Justice Kavanaugh suggests the standard of review for
deference is functionally equivalent to arbitrary and capricious review. Id.; see Motor Vehicles
Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm, 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (holding that the arbitrary and capricious standard
concerns whether the agency considered the relevant factors and whether it made a “clear error of
judgment” and requires the agency to consider the relevant data and provide a “rational connection
between the facts found and the choices made”).
319. See Turk & Woody, supra note 314, at 248 (explaining that Justice Kavanaugh likely
favors either overturning Chevron or “redefining its holding out of existence”).
320. See Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2425 (2019) (recognizing that stare decisis warranted
upholding Auer yet addressing the similarities between Skidmore and Auer’s newly cabined scope).
321. See Turk & Woody, supra note 314, at 247 (noting that the “major questions doctrine”
“carves out an exception to Chevron” in cases where ambiguous statutory language “raise[s] legal
questions of great importance”).
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City of Arlington v. Federal Communications Commission322 indicates limits
on the scope of deference. 323 And though the Chief Justice joined Justice
Kagan in retaining but limiting Auer, his refusal to join in her policy and
presumption arguments indicates an underlying skepticism of the Court’s
precedent of agency-centric deference. Chief Justice Roberts indicated there
are circumstances where refusing to defer to the agency’s interpretation
would be unreasonable.324 The Chief Justice alludes to deference’s effect as
a check against erroneous and politically-motivated interpretations which
could hamper the effectiveness of a regulatory scheme. 325 Further, Chief
Justice Roberts’ suggestion that “the distance between [Justice Kagan] and
Justice Gorsuch is not as great as it may initially appear” suggests a more
conservative approach to deference.326 Given the overlap between Skidmore
and Kisor, Chief Justice Roberts implies that narrowing Chevron could
square adherence to Chevron’s precedent with Justice Gorsuch’s Skidmoreonly jurisprudence.327
Justice Alito’s view is a bit more enigmatic. While Justice Alito’s prior
record reflects the view that Chevron is binding precedent,328 his abstention
from joining parts IV and V of Justice Gorsuch’s concurrence and his joining
in Chief Roberts’ City of Arlington dissent indicates his support for further
limiting deference.329
Ultimately, with only three Justices clearly in favor of formally
eliminating Chevron, it is probable that deference doctrine survives the
Roberts Court. Given the narrowing effect of applying Kisor’s framework to
Chevron, it is more likely that a majority of the Court would adopt limits
similar to Kisor in the future, thus rendering Chevron far more docile and
ineffective. Given recent efforts to circumscribe the administrative state,
such limitations would further diminish the administrative state’s

322. 569 U.S. 290 (2013).
323. Id. at 312 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“An agency cannot exercise interpretive authority
until it has it . . . . [W]hether an agency enjoys that authority must be decided by a court, without
deference to the agency.”).
324. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2425 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
325. See Kent Barnett, Christina L. Boyd & Cristopher J. Walker, Administrative Law’s
Political Dynamics, 71 VAND. L. REV. 1463, 1506 (2018) (concluding empirical evidence supports
“that Chevron deference appears to significantly constrain judges’ political behavior” in reviewing
statutory interpretations).
326. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2424.
327. Id.
328. See Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2129 (2018) (Alito, J., dissenting) (stating that
unless there has been “a secret decision that has somehow escaped my attention, [Chevron] remains
good law”).
329. 569 U.S. 290 (2013); see Turk & Woodley, supra note 314, at 248 (describing Chief Justice
Roberts’s dissent as “an important statement on the limits of judicial deference, which the Court’s
majority accused of having ‘Chevron itself as the ultimate target’” (quoting City of Arlington, 569
U.S. at 312)).
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institutional credibility.330 In turn, this would hinder the ability of agencies
to act pursuant to their constitutionally delegated authority.331 Moreover,
jurisdictional inconsistencies resulting from enhanced judicial discretion
would frustrate the predictability that notice-and-comment rulemaking
provides to regulated parties.332 Further, limiting Chevron would erode an
important check on ideological judicial behavior,333 with potentially
devastating implications for environmental, labor, and civil rights
regulations.334 While Justice Gorsuch is correct in noting that we once
survived in a “world without Chevron,”335 Chevron is now a cornerstone of
the modern regulatory apparatus. By continuing to chip away at the doctrine,
the Court risks collapsing the entire administrative state.
V. CONCLUSION
In Kisor, the Court correctly decided to retain and reinforce Auer
deference. In so doing, the Court realigned Auer to be more consistent with
Seminole Rock’s historic precedent.336 As a result, Kisor provides redress to
concerns about the constitutionality of deferring to an agency’s
interpretations of its own rules by establishing limitations on its application
that enhance the judge’s role and discretion.337 Yet, while Kisor justifies
deference’s practicality and bolsters the presumption that Congress intended
for deference, Justice Kagan’s opinion provides a more cautious approach
and suggests an underlying distrust of the administrative state.338 Ultimately,
330. See generally William Funk, The Attack on Administrative Regulation, 42 VT. L. REV. 427,
427–28 (2018) (arguing that there is a concerted effort in academia, “Congress, and the courts to
undermine agency regulation as fundamentally illegitimate—if not unconstitutional”).
331. See Judge Kenneth W. Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON REG.
283, 309–10 (1986) (describing Chevron’s practical consequences such as “allow[ing] agencies to
use their expertise in interpreting the many complex statutes that characterize the modern
administrative state; improv[ing] agency proceedings; encourag[ing] better legislative
draftsmanship by Congress; and permit[ing] an incoming administration to carry out its electoral
mandate more comprehensively and consistently”).
332. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the
Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 542 (2003) (explaining that notice-and-comment
rulemaking promotes predictability by allowing affected parties that participate in the rulemaking
proceedings “to anticipate the rule and plan accordingly”).
333. See Barnett, supra note 325, at 1493–1519 (showing how Chevron constrains judicial
partisanship and ideological decisionmaking).
334. See Robert L. Glicksman, Kisor v. Wilkie: A Reprieve for Embattled Administrative State?,
GEO. WASH. L. REV. On the Docket (July 3, 2019), https://www.gwlr.org/kisor-v-wilkie-a-reprievefor-embattled-administrative-state/ (arguing that allowing only Congress to regulate matters of
public health threatens to infringe on “individual interests in health, safety, and economic security”
and enhances risks to those individuals Congress deemed “to be in need of the government’s
protection”).
335. Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d. 1142, 1158 (10th Cir. 2016)(Gorsuch, J.,
concurring).
336. See supra Section IV.A.
337. See supra Section IV.B.
338. See supra Section IV.C.1.
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Kisor establishes limitations that, if applied to Chevron, would narrow the
Court’s deference doctrine even further.339 Though it is unlikely the Court
will eliminate agency deference entirely, Kisor is precursor for the further
erosion of agency deference and a bleak prognosis for deference doctrine’s
vitality. 340

339. See supra Section IV.C.2.
340. See supra Section IV.C.3.

